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Defining and Measuring Systemic Risk
With the planned implementation of the European Systematic Risk Board (ESRB) 
in 2010, European authorities are trying to identify and avoid future financial 
crises before they start. This board, under the lead of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) will have to deal with the macro-prudential supervision of the financial 
sector in Europe and is mandated to detect “systemic risks”. However, the ECB 
does not have a clear concept of systemic risk itself and even in the academia 
there exists no generally accepted definition.
Moreover, in his speech at the CEPR/ESI 
13th Annual Conference on ‘Financial Su-
pervision in an Uncertain World’ on 25-26 
September 2009 in Venice, ECB Executive 
Board Member Mr. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi 
pointed out that “firm-level data (...) have 
been recognized as essential for more ac-
curate assessments of the potential impact 
of risks materializing. (...). It should include 
better data coverage of non-regulated 
financial sectors, as well as more granular 
information on key node-institutions in the 
financial system and on potential interlink-
ages between them.”
Bini Smaghi (2009) first stressed the 
conceptual issues of systemic risk, after 
which he stressed the tasks of the ESRB 
being risk detection, risk assessment 
and ultimately issuing risk warnings. This 
briefing paper will be structured in the 
same way. First, the different definitions 
of systemic risk will be discussed, to be 
able to pinpoint the common components 
of systemic risk. Then, we will move to 
risk detection and assessment, for which 
accurate indicators should be developed 
together with the gathering of appropri-
ate data. Finally, this new way of defining 
and measuring systemic risk should be 
translated into new ESRB policy, taking 
into account that the indicators can and 
should be refined over time.
Defining Systemic Risk
The ESRB needs a clear concept of 
systemic risk to be able to measure it 
properly. There exist various definitions 
of systemic risk, which all share some 
common features. As Mr. Bini Smaghi also 
stressed, the definition introduced by the 
G10 provides a good starting point: 
“[Systemic risk is] the risk that an event 
will trigger a loss of economic value or 
confidence in, and attendant increases in 
uncertainty about, a substantial portion of 
the financial system that is serious enough 
to quite probably have significant adverse 
effects on the real economy”.
Important parts of this definition are the 
loss of confidence, increases in uncer-
tainty, the fact that a substantial portion 
of the financial system is concerned and 
ultimately the significant adverse ef-
fects on the real economy. The last part 
warrants intervention by the ESRB 
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44exist in a financial system that has limited 
capacity to withstand the impending asset 
price reversal (bust). The indicators are 
measured as deviations of variables from 
their trends, issuing a signal when this gap 
exceeds a certain threshold. The authors 
construct indicators based on credit 
variables, equity prices and property 
prices (which is quite novel). They find 
that these joint indicators work quite 
well, also out of sample (i.e. in predicting 
the current crisis) according to standard 
measures such as the noise-to-signal ratio. 
Especially the indicators including all three 
categories (credit, equity and property) 
perform well. However, the authors stress 
that there are certain caveats. First, they 
confirm that the role of expert judgment 
is still quite large, as a complement to 
the signals the indicators provide. For 
policy purposes, they thus recommend a 
threshold range instead of specific points. 
Furthermore, the indicators could be 
improved in a few dimensions. One point 
is that cross-border exposures to asset 
price movements should be incorporated 
more systematically, preferably using data 
on individual institutions at the national 
level. Here lies an important improvement 
in terms of information provision, especi-
ally for national supervisors. Additionally, 
global measures of credit growth and 
asset price movements could be used 
(see below). Next, making the asset price 
series (especially property prices) more 
homogeneous across countries could gre-
atly improve performance of the indica-
tors in comparing countries. Furthermore, 
the authors stress that further asset price 
series, such as exchange rates and credit 
risk spreads, could be useful. Finally, the 
measures of leverage should be enhanced, 
especially concerning the leverage within 
the financial system that may indicate 
limited shock absorption capacity. This is 
also addressed in the second part of this 
section. Very recently, Alessi and Detken 
(2009) have performed a thorough exerci-
se to improve the early warning indicators 
for harmful (costly) asset booms leading 
to systemic crises. They consider a host 
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in an early stage. This definition is also 
quite similar to that of the ECB, which is 
phrased in terms of financial stability (i.e. 
the absence of systemic risk):
“[Financial stability is a] condition in which 
the financial system – comprising of finan-
cial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructures – is capable of withstanding 
shocks and the unraveling of imbalances, 
thereby mitigating the likelihood of disrup-
tions in the financial intermediation process 
which are severe enough to significantly im-
pair the allocation of savings to profitable 
investment opportunities”
In this definition it is clear that the finan-
cial system is stable when it can withstand 
the shocks that are mentioned in the 
G10 definition of systemic risk, i.e. those 
shocks that cause impairment to economic 
activity through affecting the ability of 
the financial system to allocate funds. The 
definition coined by Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2009) is quite concise: 
“The risk that institutional distress spreads 
widely and distorts the supply of credit 
and capital to the real economy” 
It is similar to that used by Acharya et al. 
(2009):
“[The risk] of widespread failures of finan-
cial institutions or freezing up of capital 
markets that can substantially reduce the 
supply of such intermediated capital to the 
real economy.”
Hart and Zingales (2009) use an analo-
gous definition, which also refers to the 
risk that the failure of one institution 
leads to a failure of other institutions in 
the system, having ultimate spillover ef-
fects on the real economy. 
Borio and Drehmann (2008) have 
analyzed many definitions and concluded 
that they all have several elements in 
common, which are important to create a 
unifying understanding of systemic risk.  >
All of them consider the whole financial 
system instead of individual institutions. 
Furthermore, they stress the risk of spil-
lovers from the financial sector to the real 
economy and the costs in terms of welfare 
that are associated with these spillovers. 
Finally, most of them refer to the risk of 
financial instability, which is often more 
concrete and better measurable than 
financial stability.
Detecting and Assessing 
Systemic Risk
After having defined what is meant by 
systemic risk, it is imperative to design 
good measurement of this risk. This 
depends among others on sophistica-
ted techniques that help in designing 
indicators that warn against a systemic 
crisis, and on the availability of detailed 
information as input for these indicators. 
Furthermore, the ESRB should take into 
account interlinkages between financial 
institutions; a factor that has been widely 
overlooked during the last years. Howe-
ver, let us first focus on how to measure 
systemic risk. We can divide the measu-
rement of systemic risk into two compo-
nents, which should complement each 
other. The first consists of detecting early 
warning indicators for asset bubbles and 
the second component refers to assessing 
the individual institutions’ contribution to 
systemic risk. We will pick out the recent 
contributions to this literature.
Early Warning Indicators for 
Asset Bubbles
Borio and Drehmann (2009) improve 
upon earlier research by Borio and Lowe 
(2004) by constructing leading indica-
tors for banking crises using both credit 
variables and asset prices. They argue 
that financial imbalances, which may lead 
to banking crises, manifest themselves 
when there is a coexistence of “unusually 
rapid cumulative growth in private sector 
credit and asset prices”. This means asset 
price misalignments (usually a boom) 
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45of financial and real variables (a total of 
89), for 18 OECD countries as well as for a 
subgroup of 8 Euro Area countries. A main 
improvement of their method is that they 
determine the thresholds for indicators in 
real time, i.e. they dynamically update the 
optimal thresholds over time (as more cri-
ses have occurred). Another improvement 
is that they assess the usefulness of the 
many indicators using different criteria, 
which are determined by the weights that 
policy makers attach to type I (missing 
crises) and type II (false alarm) errors. 
In doing so, they confirm the usefulness 
results of Borio and Lowe and Borio and 
Drehmann and go even further in their as-
sessment. Arguing that the usefulness of 
indicators for policy makers is determined 
by the relative preferences with respec-
ted to missing crises and providing false 
alarms, they set up a usefulness measure 
that depends on these relative preferen-
ces. They contend that central bankers on 
average have a stronger aversion to false 
alarms than to missing crises, especially 
because of credibility concerns. However, 
these preferences may also become more 
balanced when considering the severity 
of the recent financial crisis, which may 
explain the growing interest in early war-
ning systems. The authors consider one 
indicator, the global private credit gap, 
that predicts 82% of the crises correctly 
and has a 32% share of false alarms as the 
best performing indicator when preferen-
ces are relatively balanced, for both the 18 
country sample and the smaller Euro Area 
sample. It also has an average lead time 
for its first signal of 5.5 quarters before 
a crisis actually begins. Following Borio 
and Drehmann, the authors also construct 
joint indicators, which is a good way of 
reducing the noisiness of signals. Howe-
ver, they do not improve much upon the 
usefulness of individual indicators when 
using the preference weights. Further-
more, there is a large within-sample 
crosscountry variation in these indicators, 
which raises issues when using aggregated 
data coming from individual countries.
Finally, Alessi and Detken conclude 
that global financial variables perform 
best in predicting costly booms, where 
global credit slightly outperforms global 
money. However, the authors also stress 
that signals should be interpreted very 
carefully and should definitely not be 
considered as the only input to the policy 
maker’s information set. Furthermore, the 
codependence among variables should be 
further explored, as well as other balance 
sheet items of financial intermediaries 
(especially concerning leverage). When 
potentially harmful asset booms that can 
lead to systemic crises are identified, we 
also need to single out the financial insti-
tutions (FIs) that constitute the highest 
risk for the system so regulatory action 
can be taken. Several financial experts 
have provided contributions to this lite-
rature on systemically relevant financial 
institutions.
Individual Institutions’ 
Contribution to Systemic Risk
Acharya et al. (2009) adopt standard 
techniques that are used to manage risk 
within banks to consider the risk of the 
financial system as a whole. They begin 
by stressing that current regulation and 
measurement is aimed at limiting each 
institution’s risk in isolation without 
paying enough attention to systemic risk. 
The authors specify a measure of margi-
nal expected shortfall (MES) as used in 
Value at Risk (VaR) approaches applied 
by banks, which measures the loss in case 
returns go below a certain percentile of 
the distribution (i.e. 1% or 5% on the 
left side). This measure can be calcula-
ted for each individual group or trading 
desk within an institution, called MESi; 
it measures how each group’s risk taking 
adds to the financial institution’s overall 
risk. However, the authors argue that 
this measure can also be calculated for a 
financial institution as a whole, where the 
MESi measures the contribution of each 
FI to the risk of the complete financial 
system. Then, they define a measure of 
systemic expected shortfall (SES), which 
is related to the MES taking leverage and 
risk taking into account. It measures the 
effect of externalities from the ban-
king sector to the real economy. These 
externalities take place when aggregate 
banking capital drops below a certain 
threshold (which can be optimally esti-
mated) and thus certain institutions may 
fail; the externalities are also increasing in 
the size of the capital drop. The individual 
measure SESi increases when a particular 
bank has high leverage (also subject to 
a bankspecific threshold) and takes high 
risks, in which case this bank has a high 
contribution to systemic risk (and thus a 
high SESi). Finally, the authors estimate 
the SESi for several large institutions, and 
the results confirm that the institutions 
that contributed most to the crisis indeed 
had a large SESi. They conclude that the 
measurement SESi can be improved when 
regulators gather more specific data on 
FIs, which constitutes a task for national 
regulators.
One possible drawback of the above 
method is that it is difficult to determine 
when the systemically relevant institutions 
are likely to fail and cause spillovers to the 
real economy. Hart and Zingales (2009) 
use credit default swap (CDS)2 prices 
(which are market based) as an indicator 
of default for systemic institutions and as 
a trigger for regulatory action. This me-
chanism bypasses credit rating agencies, 
whose incentives and efforts have become 
regarded as flawed recently. The authors 
argue that if we want to maintain a system 
of financial institutions that are too big 
to fail (LFIs) we need a mechanism that 
provides warnings when these instituti-
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46ons may experience distress. They set up a 
system similar to that of margin calls, with 
CDS prices on the LFI’s debt as a trig-
ger mechanism. Credit default swaps are 
instruments that are standardized and fre-
quently traded, so their prices are a good 
indicator for the likelihood that a large FI 
will default. Hart and Zingales then set up 
a system in which a sufficiently high CDS 
price will trigger regulatory investigation 
of the LFI. The regulator will in the end 
decide whether the institution is adequa-
tely capitalized (i.e. debt is not at risk) 
or not and, in the latter case, will take 
over the company. It will then recapitalize 
and sell it, wiping out existing creditors 
and imposing a haircut on creditors. This 
threat, as argued by the authors, can be 
used to make LFIs issue sufficient capital 
ex ante so they will never be faced with 
the abovementioned regulatory proce-
dure. The (anticipated) behaviour of the 
CDS price will thus be an indicator for the 
solvency of systemically important insti-
tutions. The advantages of this method to 
measure systemic risk are that it uses data 
for individual institutions and is forward 
looking. However, the method is still 
relying mainly on market data and does 
not indicate which FIs are systemic. Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2009), besides consi-
dering the contribution of one institution 
to the stability of the system, additionally 
take into account the abovementioned 
point about the systemic interconnected-
ness of institutions and the effects they 
have on each other. This issue of financial 
network effects has already been stressed 
in the early 2000’s, among others by Allen 
and Gale (2000) and Kiyotaki and Moores 
(2002). It has indeed become clear that 
financial institutions, regulated and 
non-regulated, were much more intercon-
nected than regulators have been able to 
assess during the last decade.
Therefore, Adrian and Brunnermeier 
propose a measure called CoVaRi, which is 
defined as the VaR of the whole financial 
system conditional on institution i being 
in distress. The difference between the 
CoVaRi and the unconditional VaR of the 
financial system, denoted as ΔCoVaR, 
denotes (as in Acharya et al. (2009)) the 
marginal contribution of a particular insti-
tution to the overall systemic risk. The au-
thors argue that their measure has several 
advantages. First, it captures systemic risk 
per institution alongside the individual 
risk of this institution, opposite to current 
risk measures. The main conclusion here is 
that institutions may have a low VaR but 
a high CoVaR; something that is not cap-
tured in current regulation. Second, the 
CoVaR can also be used to gauge spillover 
effects from one institution to another: 
ΔCoVaRi|j denotes the increase in risk of 
institution i conditional on institution j 
already being in distress, or the effect 
that distress of institution j has on the risk 
of institution i. Finally, this measure can 
also be extended to expected shortfall 
(see above) so as to construct a Co-ES 
measure, which indicates the expected 
losses of the whole financial system when 
a systemic crisis occurs. The authors then 
delineate several methods to estimate 
CoVaR, including quintile regressions and 
panel data methods, which are dynamic 
enough to capture the changing nature 
of CoVaR. They then argue that their 
measure can be used as a basis for macro-
prudential regulation by i.e. imposing 
systemic risk weighted capital charges.
The abovementioned measures of sys-
temic risk contribution can complement 
each other: the methods of Acharya et 
al. and Adrian and Brunnermeier can be 
used to determine which institutions are 
possibly a threat to systemic stability 
(including their network effects), while 
the measure of Hart and Zingales can be 
employed to determine when this threat 
may materialize so regulators can take 
timely prudential action. 
Policy Action
The abovementioned measures of 
systemic risk can provide early warnings 
for a systemic crisis. The first part of 
them focuses on aggregate systemic risk, 
indicated by asset booms, while the se-
cond part focuses on the contribution of 
individual financial institutions to the risk 
of the financial system as a whole. It must 
be stressed that both types of measures 
should be used in tandem, and that the 
previous section of this briefing paper is 
not exhaustive but only a characteriza-
tion of the measures necessary to gauge 
systemic risk properly. For the newly to be 
established ESRB this means that it should 
take into account all these indicators (and 
more) in the establishment of its regula-
tory policy. These indicators can be used 
by the ESRB to set up macro-prudential 
regulation for the European financial 
system and, together with national su-
pervisors, for establishing the prudential 
regulation of individual institutions that 
contribute to a great extent to syste-
mic instability. It is important to base 
new regulatory policy on a broad set of 
systemic risk measures, and evaluate their 
performance over time. It should be noted 
that it is an extremely difficult task. Too 
large a set of systemic risk measures will 
not solve anything but rather keep the 
confusion in place. For example, some of 
the indicators could send warning signals 
while others may not. It then comes to 
the question of interpretation and thus 
subjectivity, the very think that must be 
avoided as much as possible. Too narrow 
a set of systemic risk indicators entails 
the danger that warning signals could not 
be picked up early enough. Therefore, 
the ESRB should approach this as a signal 
extraction problem, which can be solved 
by Bayesian updating until a compact set 
of useful indicators remains. This set, with 
appropriate weights on each indicator, 
can serve as a basis for European macro-
prudential regulation.
The complicating factor according to 
Eijffinger and Mujagic (2009) is that the 
policy instruments of the ECB and ESRB 
must be independent of each other. 
The (interbank) money markets interest 




47stability and financial stability, as the 
outlook for price stability could warrant 
higher interest rates, while ensuring 
financial stability might require a lower 
interest rate. Finding new instru-
ments that are effective, easy to use, 
and independent of the interest-rate 
instrument seems to be an impossible 
task. And yet there is a solution. Central 
banks should give the growth of (broad) 
money supply more prominence in their 
monetary policy strategies. The ECB 
with its often criticized monetary pillar 
may have a head start. Important central 
banks, such as the Bank of England 
and the United States Federal Reserve, 
kept their key interest rates too low 
for too long leading to a long period of 
double-digit growth in money supply. 
The ECB was more cautious. To be sure, 
the fall of the risk premium on financial 
markets, the development of all kinds 
of exotic derivatives, and these deri-
vatives’ subsequent misuse sowed the 
seeds for this crisis, but those factors 
could not have caused the crisis without 
the plentiful rainfall that allowed those 
seeds to grow.
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